How can psychological science enhance the effectiveness of identification procedures? An international comparison.

The sequential double-blind method protects the guilty, moving video images protect the innocent (a little), but foil selection strategy makes no difference.

Tim Valentine, Stephen Darling and Amina Memon

The reliability of eyewitness identification has attracted concern from the legal profession in England for at least 100 years. In 1904 a committee of enquiry was established to investigate the trials of Adolf Beck. Incredibly, on two separate occasions Adolf Beck was wrongly convicted on the basis of mistaken eyewitness identification. In both trials, multiple eyewitnesses identified Beck as a confidence trickster who stole jewellery from them. The crimes were subsequently found to have been committed by William Wyatt. The 1904 Committee of enquiry led directly to the establishment of a Court of Appeal.

Concern about further wrongful convictions based on mistaken identification led to a government enquiry into the reliability of eyewitness identification evidence, chaired by Lord Devlin, which reported in 1976. The Devlin report led directly to a landmark judgement in the English Court of Appeal, which established a requirement that in cases of disputed identification the trial judge must caution the jury about the dangers of eyewitness identification evidence. The judge should point out that confident eyewitnesses may be mistaken and instruct the jury to consider carefully the circumstances of the identification.

From this historical perspective, it is unsurprising to learn that mistaken eyewitness identification is also a major problem for the United States courts.
Nevertheless, the extent of the problem has proved to be greater than many may have anticipated. The work of the U.S. Innocence Project, which to date has led to 183 prisoners being exonerated by new DNA evidence, found that mistaken eyewitness identification was a factor contributing to three-quarters of the original wrongful convictions.⁵

**Recent developments to eyewitness identification procedures**

Eyewitness identification procedures used in the United States and the United Kingdom have some important differences. In the United States, live lineups and identification from arrays of photographs are both frequently used to collect formal eyewitness identification. Traditionally, in the United Kingdom all formal eyewitness identification evidence has been obtained from live lineups. Identification from arrays of photographs has never been permitted as a formal means of identification. Over the last few years video has replaced almost all live lineups. This innovation has been made possible by development of sophisticated computer systems used to compile video lineups from a standardised database of moving video clips.

Recently, identification procedures in the United States have been the subject of consultation with eyewitness researchers. Identification from arrays of photographs is still widely used, but the U.S. National Institute of Justice set up a Technical Working Party for Eyewitness Evidence to review procedure and produced a guide to best practice.

**Recent developments to identification procedures in the USA**

The U. S. National Institute of Justice document *Eyewitness identification: A guide for law enforcement* (“the Guide”)⁶ includes the following guidance:
• The foils in a lineup should be selected to generally match the witness’
description of the culprit.
• There should be a minimum of five foils.
• The witness should be advised that the culprit may or may not be in the
lineup.
• The witness should state in their own words how confident they are of any
identification.

Two methods of lineup presentation are endorsed by the Guide: 1) a
*simultaneous* lineup, in which the witness is permitted to inspect all of the
photographs or lineup members before making an identification and 2) a *sequential*
lineup, in which the witness sees one photograph or person at a time and makes a
decision prior to viewing any other photograph or person. The guide does not express
any preference for one method over the other. The procedures mentioned here do not
form an exhaustive list of the provisions in the Guide. It should be noted that the
guidance is a recommendation of best practice and has no direct legal force.

In an earlier ‘white paper’, written under the auspices of the American
Psychology - Law Society (“AP-LS”), psychologists had advocated that the person
who administers a lineup should not know which person in the lineup is the police
suspect. That is to say that the administrator should be ‘blind’ to the identity of the
suspect. This procedure is known as ‘double-blind’ as neither the administrator nor
the witness has prior knowledge of who the suspect is in the lineup. This measure was
strongly advocated by researchers because it removes all possibility of the witness
being influenced by the lineup administrator. Such influence can be very subtle and
may occur without any intention or awareness of either the administrator or the
witness. The double-blind procedure is well established as an important aspect of
scientific enquiry. For example, neither the patient nor the clinical staff should know which patients received a placebo in a drug trial. A recommendation of the double-blind method is conspicuously absent from recommended best practice in the Guide on eyewitness identification.

Research based on identification from photograph arrays suggests that mistaken identification can be reduced by sequential presentation of the photographs as outlined in the Guide. However, the Guide did not include the important stipulation of a ‘sequential double-blind method.’ Under sequential presentation instructions the witness should make a decision after viewing each photograph as to whether he or she is the culprit. If the witness rejects the photograph they are shown the next photograph. The procedure stops when the witness makes an identification. The method endorsed by researchers crucially stipulates that the witness should not know how many photographs are in the lineup, the witness is given unbiased instructions (e.g., that the person they saw may or may not be in the lineup) and, importantly, that the administrator is blind to the identity of the suspect.

Sequential presentation is believed to reduce mistaken identification by reducing the opportunity for the witness to make a relative judgement. In the traditional simultaneous presentation, a witness who believes that the culprit is in the lineup may identify the person who most looks like the person they saw, having had the opportunity to view all the photographs in an array. Sequential presentation aims to prevent relative judgements by forcing the witness to make independent judgements to each lineup member. Sequential presentation has been adopted in some jurisdictions in the United States. However, in some cases the strict procedure advocated by researchers has not been followed in all of its aspects. It is worth noting
that researchers did not include sequential presentation amongst the recommendations of the AP-LS white paper.\textsuperscript{11}

**Recent developments to identification procedures in England & Wales**

The Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984 (“PACE”), which applies in England and Wales (but not in Scotland or Northern Ireland), includes a code of practice for identification by eyewitnesses (“code D”). The code can be revised without the need for new primary legislation. In recent years the code has been revised on an annual basis. The current code of practice (2005)\textsuperscript{12} includes the following provisions:

- A lineup that includes one suspect must consist of at least eight foils.
- The foils must resemble the suspect in age, general appearance and position in life.
- The suspect has the right for their legal representative to be present during the identification procedure.
- The person who administers the lineup cannot be involved in the investigation of the case (but note that the administrator does know who the suspect is).
- Witnesses must be advised that the person they saw may or may not be present.
- Witnesses must be advised that if they cannot make a positive identification they should say so.
- Witnesses must view each member of the lineup twice before making any identification.
- Video identification should be used unless there is a reason why a live identification is more appropriate.
Although the code of practice does not have statutory force, trial judges have the discretion to exclude or allow eyewitness identification evidence. Therefore police forces have systems in place to demonstrate compliance with the code.

Two different IT systems are in widespread use in British police forces to provide video identification. VIPER™ (Video Identification Procedure Electronic Recording) and PROMAT™ (Profile Matching). The systems produce similar formats of video lineup, but each has its own database of images. Lineups consist of 15 second clips of each person shown one after another. The sequence starts with a head and shoulders shot of the person looking directly at the camera, who slowly turns their head to present a full right profile to the camera. The person then slowly rotates their head to present a full left profile to the camera. Finally the person returns to looking directly into the camera in a full-face pose.

Research on video identification

Research has demonstrated that VIPER video lineups from real criminal cases were fairer to the suspects than conventional ‘live’ lineups, and that VIPER video lineups were equally fair to white European and African–Caribbean suspects. In these studies, participants (known as ‘mock witnesses’) were shown a set of videos of VIPER lineups or a set of photographs of live lineups held as part of the investigation of the case. For each lineup they were given the first description of the offender made by the original witness. The mock witnesses were required to choose, on the basis of the witness’ description, the lineup member who they think is most likely to be the police suspect. Therefore, a ‘mock witness’ simulates a witness who (a) has no memory of the culprit at the time of the identification procedure; (b) can remember the description they previously gave to the police and (c) nevertheless, makes an identification from the lineup. If the lineup is perfectly fair, and all members fit the
description, the mock witness would have no basis on which to make their selection and would merely have to guess who is the suspect. Therefore, if a large number of the mock witnesses are asked to make a selection they would select the suspect on 11 percent of occasions (1 in 9) from each lineup, because the lineups all contained a suspect and eight foils.

Using this procedure 25 percent of mock witnesses (1 in 4) chose the suspect in the live lineups, more than expected by chance (25 percent vs. 11 percent). In comparison, 15 percent of mock witnesses selected the suspect from the videos of VIPER lineups. Statistical analysis showed that the VIPER lineups were significantly fairer than the live parades (15 percent vs. 25 percent), and the VIPER lineups were not significantly less fair than expected by chance (15 percent vs. 11 percent).

Previous data from real cases suggested that live lineups may be less fair to ethnic minorities than to white Europeans. Therefore, the fairness of VIPER lineups of African–Caribbeans and of white Europeans was compared. The VIPER parades were found to be equally fair to suspects of both ethnic groups.

**Benefits of video identifications**

Video identification has a number of important benefits compared to live lineups. First, use of video can dramatically reduce the delay before an identification can be organized. Live lineups have been subject to long delays to enable a selection of appropriate foils to be available to stand on a lineup (typically of one to three months). In contrast, VIPER can usually produce a video lineup within two hours of request. Second, approximately 50 percent of live lineups in England and Wales were cancelled, for example, due to failure of a bailed suspect to attend, failure of the witness to attend or lack of suitable volunteers. Cancellations contribute to a further
increase in delay before the witness can view a lineup. Since the introduction of video identification, the proportion of procedures cancelled has fallen to around five percent. Third, availability of a large database of video clips from which to select foils (approximately 12,000) makes lineups fairer to the suspect. Fourth, use of video is less threatening to victims, who no longer have to attend an identification suite where their attacker may be physically present. A further advantage is that a laptop can be taken to a witness who is unable to attend the police station. In a recent high-profile case, Abigail Witchalls, a victim of an attack who was left paralysed, was able to view a video lineup from her hospital bed, and a suspect was eliminated from the enquiry as a result.

**Can psychological science improve the effectiveness of video identification?**

An empirical investigation was recently conducted in our laboratory to investigate whether the effectiveness of the British video identification procedure could be enhanced by adopting: (a) a sequential double-blind procedure and (b) selecting foils that match the witness description of the culprit rather than foils who resemble the suspect. The impact of using moving rather than still video images was also investigated. Substantial laboratory experiments designed to simulate a forensically relevant situation as closely as possible are described.

**Sequential double-blind presentation**

Video identification naturally yields a sequential presentation. Research based on identification from photograph arrays suggests that sequential presentation can reduce mistaken identifications when the witness is required to make a decision after viewing each person as to whether he or she is the culprit. However, the current PACE code of practice does not allow any advantage of sequential presentation to be realised because it requires witnesses to view the entire lineup twice before making
any decision.\textsuperscript{22} Thus, the question arises of whether video identification procedures could be improved by allowing the sequential double-blind instructions to be used.

We compared the outcomes of lineups when participant witnesses viewed a video lineup conducted under sequential double-blind instructions to the outcomes when following the procedures currently used by the police.\textsuperscript{23} Although the lineup administrator in police lineups is not blind to the identity of the suspect, for consistency all lineups in our experiments were conducted double-blind. All of the lineups were constructed under supervision of the police using the VIPER national database of foils. A video clip of the actors who played the role of a thief in our experiment were recorded at VIPER-equipped police stations under standardised conditions, following the same procedure as used with police suspects. Approximately 200 students were recruited in small groups to take part in a study on mood and health. During the procedure the witnesses viewed an unexpected staged theft of a laptop. They gave a written description of the culprit. Participants returned after approximately seven days to view a video lineup. Half of the participants saw a lineup that included the culprit, half saw a lineup which included an innocent suspect. The foils in the lineups were always the same people. The experimenter, who could not see the faces on the video screen, did not know whether the culprit was in the lineup. All witnesses were advised that the person they saw may or may not be present in the lineup, and that if they could not make a positive identification they should say so. Under the sequential double-blind instructions, witnesses saw the video of the first lineup member. They were asked if he was the culprit, or if they would like to see the clip again. If the witness identified the lineup member as the culprit the procedure ended. If they rejected the line member they were shown the next clip. The witness was told that once they had proceeded to the next lineup member they could not
change their mind or go back to view a previous image. They were not told how many
people were in the lineup. In the control condition, following the existing code of
practice, witnesses were instructed to watch the entire lineup twice before making any
identification. They could ask to see the video clips of any of the lineup members
again prior to make an identification.

Under sequential double-blind instructions there were significantly fewer
correct identifications from culprit present video lineups compared to the existing
procedure (36 percent vs. 65 percent of witnesses, see Figure 1). There were also
fewer mistaken identifications of foils from culprit absent lineups (23 percent to 10
percent), but the latter effect was not statistically significant (Figure 2). The sequential
instructions appear to reduce the rate of choosing, and therefore suppress correct
identifications as well as incorrect identifications.

Sequential double-blind viewing instructions are believed to reduce the
number of mistaken identifications by making it difficult for witnesses to make a
relative judgement. In our experiment, we asked the witnesses whether they had
compared the faces of lineup members with each other or whether they had
considered each person one at a time. 93 percent of witnesses who viewed a culprit
present lineup answered ‘one at a time’, regardless of the viewing instructions they
had been given. The naturally sequential presentation of a video lineup may make
relative judgements very difficult even under the existing procedure. When these data
for the culprit absent lineups are considered the proportion of witnesses answering
‘one at a time’ dropped to 80 percent under both lineup instructions. Thus, the
presence of the culprit influenced the strategy witnesses used but the sequential
double-blind instructions did not.
Recent research clearly shows that there is a reduction in the number of correct identifications of offenders under sequential double-blind instructions. In 2001, a combined analysis of 23 studies reported this effect.\textsuperscript{24} The Illinois Pilot Program, an evaluation of the sequential double-blind produce in real cases conducted by the Chicago Police, found the same effect.\textsuperscript{25} We have also found a reduction in correct identifications in a laboratory study under realistic conditions using video lineups constructed from the police national database of foils under police supervision. Although sequential double-blind presentation may provide some modest protection to innocent suspects, it did not show a reliable effect in our laboratory.

**Moving images compared with stills**

As part of the same experiment we have also investigated whether the moving images used in video identification contribute to its success compared to single full-face images, as frequently used in American photograph lineups. Intuition suggests that witnesses may be more likely to be able to identify a culprit from a moving video sequence that allows the face to be seen from a variety of angles. However, results from the live staged-incident experiment using video lineups showed that this was not the case. The rate of correct identification from culprit present video lineups was the same for 15-second moving video clips and for static full-face images presented on a monitor for 15 seconds (Figure 3). When the culprit was not in the lineup, there were significantly fewer mistaken identifications of foils from moving clips than from still images (Figure 4). Thus the use of moving video clips improves the fairness of lineups without affecting the sensitivity of the procedure. The same trend was found in a subsequent experiment, but the difference in mistaken identifications from culprit absent lineups between moving and still images was not statistically significant. When data was combined from an experimental condition which was common to both
experiments, based on the existing identification procedure (i.e. viewing all lineup members twice), the advantage for moving images in culprit absent lineups was still significant. In conclusion, use of moving images may offer some protection to innocent suspects, but the size of any effect is small.

**Research comparing selection of foils by culprit description and by suspect resemblance**

The aim of a further experiment was to investigate whether video identifications could be made more reliable by using a culprit-description strategy, rather than a suspect-resemblance strategy to select the foils. The U.S. National Institute of Justice Technical Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence recommended use of a culprit description strategy. In contrast, the English code of practice requires a suspect resemblance strategy.

When the police in England construct a video lineup they choose foils on the basis of their resemblance to the suspect. The problem with this strategy is that high similarity between the suspect and foils makes identification of an offender present in the lineup very difficult even for a witness who has a good memory of the offender. The logical extreme is a lineup of clones, which obviously would render the process ineffective.

The logic behind a culprit description strategy is that the witness may remember the description they gave to the police and may look for somebody who matches that description. If all foils have been selected to match that description there will no bias against the suspect. It does not make a lineup unfair if the members differ in characteristics not mentioned in the description. In fact, this is a useful characteristic of a lineup. A witness seeing an offender on a lineup may recognise a
feature they did not describe. However, this is no more likely to occur for an innocent suspect than for any of the foils.29

The effectiveness of a culprit description strategy and a suspect resemblance strategy was compared in an experiment using a staged live incident similar to that described above. All witnesses provided a written description of the offender immediately after an unexpected staged incident. The participants individually attended a video identification approximately a week after the incident. All video identifications were conducted in accordance with the current code of practice, except that the administrator was always blind to the identity of the suspect and did not know if the culprit was in the lineup. The lineups were constructed from the VIPER national database of foils. Half of the lineups were constructed using the suspect resemblance strategy required by the code of practice. The remaining lineups were constructed by selecting foils who matched the description given by the individual witness. Within that constraint, foils were selected who differed as much as possible, although foils did not differ on substantial ‘default’ features that may not have been included in the description (e.g., male, white). Each culprit description lineup was thus individually tailored to match the description given by each witness.

The results showed that the foil selection strategy did not have any significant effect on the outcome of lineups, whether the culprit was present or not (Figures 5 and 6). One explanation for this null result may be that the two selection strategies used in the experiment failed to manipulate adequately the similarity of foils to the suspect or the match to the culprit description. To check the effectiveness of the selection strategies, additional participants provided subjective ratings of the similarity of the foils to the suspect and the extent to which the foils matched the description given by the witness. Lineups produced using the suspect resemblance strategy contained foils
that were rated as more similar to the suspect than did the lineups compiled using the culprit description strategy. Furthermore, the foils in the culprit description lineups were rated as matching the witness description better than the foils in the suspect resemblance lineups. Both of these effects were statistically significant, demonstrating that the manipulation of the structure of lineups had been successful. Therefore the experiment provided an adequate test of the culprit description strategy, but showed that it offered no benefit compared to the existing procedure.

**Implications for policy development**

The results of our experiments showed that proposed modifications based on insights from psychological science did not improve on the effectiveness of the existing procedure of video lineups used in England and Wales. Adoption of the sequential double-blind method made the procedure less sensitive, in effect protecting the guilty, and did not provide a significant improvement in the protection provided to innocent suspects. It is relatively easy to make an identification procedure fairer by making it less sensitive (i.e., more difficult for a reliable witness to identify a guilty suspect). The challenge for eyewitness researchers is to make identification procedures fairer without sacrificing sensitivity. In conclusion, we do not recommend combining sequential double-blind instructions with video identification.

There was some evidence from our experiments, and which has been found in some, but not all, previous research that use of moving images decreases the number of mistaken identifications of foils without affecting the number of correct identifications of guilty suspects. Therefore, use of moving images meets the desired outcome of improving fairness without reducing sensitivity. However, the size of the effect is small, and we did not replicate the effect in a subsequent experiment. Taking
the results as a whole, use of still images fared surprisingly well compared to the 15 second moving images used in the VIPER system, which show a wide range of views.

Adoption of a culprit description matching strategy to select foils for the lineup was shown to have successfully produced lineups that contained foils that were less similar to the suspect and more similar to the witness description. Notwithstanding the desired effect on the structure of the lineup, the culprit-description strategy did not improve, but did not diminish, the effectiveness of the procedures.

We broadly endorse the position advocated by eyewitness witness researchers in the AP-LS white paper. In this document four rules were proposed, which can be summarised as, blind administration, unbiased instructions, the suspect should not stand out in appearance and a clear statement of confidence should be taken. Sequential presentations were not endorsed in the AP-LS white paper.

The British procedure already includes unbiased instructions, and as we have seen, the suspect resemblance strategy in constructing video lineups from the VIPER database produces lineups that are as effective as culprit-description match lineups. British identification procedures would be enhanced by adopting the blind administration rule and by taking a clear statement of confidence before the witness leaves the identification suite. Keeping the lineup administrator blind to the identity of the suspect would enhance the integrity of identification procedures. In the past, blind administration with live lineups posed some difficult practical problems, not least extra demands on resources and personnel. Now that lineups are conducted on video, blind administration is easily achieved by use of a second computer monitor for the administrator. The administrator’s screen can simply be covered so that only the number of the person in the lineup and the on-screen DVD controls can be seen. The
existing procedure provides protection against gross misconduct by the police by the presence of a legal representative of the suspect.

Under the current British procedure anything said by the witness in the ID suite should be in the presence of the suspect’s representative and should be written down by the police. Nevertheless, a formal witness statement is taken after the witness has left the suite. In some cases, the identification in the formal statement is different from the outcome recorded in the identification suite. Courts often place much emphasis on the confidence the witness displays during the trial. Research has clearly shown that witness confidence can be affected by information acquired after the identification. Therefore, there is strong case to ensure a clear statement of confidence is always recorded before the witness leaves the ID suite.

It is unfortunate that the current debate about U.S. identification procedures appears to have conflated double-blind lineup administration with use of the sequential presentation method. Although the effects of sequential presentation may be subject to debate, there is a compelling case to enforce blind lineup administration, unbiased instructions, selection of foils amongst whom the suspect does not stand out and the recording of a clear statement of confidence. The British procedure of allowing defence representation at the lineup administration has much to commend it as a safeguard for an innocent suspect.

The interpretation of witness confidence is as much a matter for appropriate advice to jury members and lawyers as for identification procedures. However, such advice does not always cause jurors to be suitably sceptical of tenuous eyewitness evidence. In a well-known case in England, Barry George was convicted of the assassination of Jill Dando, a famous TV presenter. The main prosecution evidence against him was that he was identified during the identification procedure by only one
of 16 witnesses who attended a lineup. The witness who identified Barry George had not witnessed the murder but saw a man in the street about four hours before the murder. By her own testimony she saw his face for five to six seconds. The identification procedure was held approximately 18 months after the murder. Nevertheless she was a highly convincing witness in court. The judge gave the appropriate ‘Turnbull’ warning to the jury about the problems of eyewitness identification evidence. The jury convicted by a 10-1 majority. The conviction was upheld on appeal.
Figure captions.

Figure 1: The outcome of culprit present video lineups run under the existing ‘view the lineup twice’ instruction and the sequential method. All lineup were administered double-blind. Statistically there were significantly more correct identifications of a guilty suspect made under the view twice instructions (p<.05).

Figure 2: The outcome of culprit absent video lineups run under the existing ‘view the lineup twice’ instruction and the sequential method. All lineups were administered double-blind. There were no statistically significant differences between the outcomes.

Figure 3: The outcome of culprit present video lineups run under the existing ‘view the lineup twice’ instruction when moving 15 second video clips were used and a single full-face video still was presented for 15 seconds. All lineups were administered double-blind. There were no statistically significant differences between the outcomes.

Figure 4: The outcome of culprit absent video lineups run under the existing ‘view the lineup twice’ instruction when moving 15 second video clips were used and a single full-face video still was presented for 15 seconds. All lineups were administered double-blind. Statistically there were significantly fewer mistaken identifications of a foil made when moving video clips were used (p<.05).

Figure 5: The outcome of culprit present video lineups run under the existing ‘view the lineup twice’ instruction when the foils were selected using the existing suspect resemblance strategy and when a culprit description matching strategy was
used. All lineups were administered double-blind. There were no statistically significant differences between the outcomes.

Figure 6: The outcome of culprit absent video lineups run under the existing ‘view the lineup twice’ instruction when the foils were selected using the existing suspect resemblance strategy and when a culprit description matching strategy was used. All lineup were administered double-blind. There were no statistically significant differences between the outcomes.
Figure 1

Culprit present lineups

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<th>Correct ID</th>
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<tr>
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Percentage of witnesses
Figure 2

Culprit absent lineups

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<td>Sequential</td>
<td>90</td>
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Percentage of witnesses

- Correct rejection
- Foil ID
Figure 3

Culprit present lineups

Percentage of witnesses

- Moving: 56 (Correct ID), 17 (Incorrect rejection), 8 (Foil ID)
- Still: 46 (Correct ID), 24 (Incorrect rejection), 12 (Foil ID)
Figure 4

Culprit absent lineups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>Moving</td>
<td>92% Correct rejection, 8% Foil ID</td>
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<tr>
<td>Still</td>
<td>74% Correct rejection, 26% Foil ID</td>
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Figure 6

Culprit absent lineups

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<th>Suspect resemblance</th>
<th>Correct rejection</th>
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<td>Culprit description</td>
<td>Correct rejection</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>Foil ID</td>
<td>22%</td>
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Percentage of witnesses

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7 Id.


11 Lindsay & Wells, *supra* note 9.


13 Although PACE does not apply in Scotland and Northern Ireland, both countries are following similar procedures and are introducing video identification.


17 Id.

18 Id.

19 Valentine, Harris, Colom Piera & Darling, *supra* note 15.


22 Police and Criminal Evidence Act Codes of Practice, *supra* note 12.
23 T. Valentine, S. Darling & A. Memon, Do strict rules and moving images increase the reliability of sequential identifications procedures (forthcoming)(manuscript on file with authors).


26 S. Darling, T. Valentine & A. Memon, Selecting lineup foils in operational contexts: Description matching does not help (forthcoming)(manuscript on file with authors).

27 National Institute of Justice, supra note 6.

28 Police and Criminal Evidence Act Codes of Practice, supra note 12.


30 Wells, et al., supra note 8.

31 Id.

32 If the suspect is not represented, the entire identification procedure should be recorded on video.